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Abstract:
Sports leagues provide an interesting window to view issues that larger economies face that
are much harder to measure due to their complexity. These leagues have many policy tools similar
to those used in major world economies such as minimum wage, price ceilings, labor unions, and
revenue sharing, although the impact of these policies are much easier to measure in the closed
economy model of a sports league because the income and output of every player in a given year is
known. In this paper, I measure the level and trend of income inequality in the NBA, NFL, and MLB,
by deriving the Lorenz Curve of income inequality for each league and calculating a GINI index for
each league. From here, I will compare the structural differences and similarities in the salary cap
and revenue sharing models of each league to determine the impact of these policies on income
parity. The results reveal that MLB is the most unequal of the leagues as measured by GINI index,
variance of league salaries, and average variance of team salaries as a result of a soft salary cap and
weak revenue sharing model. When measuring the GINI index by the total amount of money
contributed to the salary cap each year, the NBA is slightly more equally distributed than the NFL,
however this difference disappears when simply measuring GINI by a player’s base salary due to the
excessive use of bonuses in player contracts in the NFL.

Thurman 3
Introduction
Imagine an entity that has a central governing body serving over numerous semiautonomous institutions. These institutions must abide by a set of rules introduced by the governing
body, but are permitted to set some of their own rules to govern their citizens, provided that they
do not directly conflict with the rules agreed upon by the governing body. Representatives from
each institution make up the governing body, which is presided over by an elected leader with a
specified set of powers. Each institution is allowed to set its own budget and raise its own revenue;
however it must pay taxes to the governing body. This entity allows imports, that is to say it is not
closed off to other entities, though it has special rules to facilitate the arrival of imports. Inside this
entity there exists a minimum wage as well as a progressive tax based on earnings. The minimum
wage and other issues involving the well-being of the citizens are expressed through a labor union
which takes part in negotiations with the governing body, but is not part of the governing body.
Does this entity sound familiar? The picture painted above no doubt appears to be the Federal
system that defines the United States of America. It might come as a surprise, however, that this
entity could also be Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), or the
National Basketball Association (NBA).
It is perhaps not by mistake that the organization of the highest sports institutions in
America closely resembles the organization of the United States government at first glance. For the
purposes of this paper, the similarities that exist between the structure of the United States
government and the previously mentioned professional sports leagues permit easy comparison
between how specific choices in their organization has affected the allocation of resources,
specifically wages. In line with the thinking presented in the previous paragraph, we can begin to
think about American professional sports leagues using a variety of well-known economic ideas.
Sports leagues in particular allow for unique examination because the income of every player (or
laborer) is known and their production in a given year can be easily measured, whereas this type of
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data is nearly impossible to compile for any given country. This is to say that an individual sports
league can be thought of as a “closed economy”, where the allocation of resources, income, and
production of every member in a given year is known, and these inputs and outputs remain inside
this economy. It is worth noting that a player may enter a league during the course of a season from
another league, for instance a MLB team could sign a player from the Japanese professional baseball
league, but the exchange of resources is between the player and MLB team, meaning that the
wealth remains in the economy. Given that we now have three distinct economies (MLB, NFL, NBA)
with easily comparable structures, we can examine how specific policy decisions, for instance the
use of price ceilings and floors (salary caps and minimum wage), have impacted the distribution of
wealth in each league. This comparison would be extremely difficult if not impossible for most
countries given the incredible complexity of the economy and the fact that a policy decision made in
one country could impact the flow and allocation of resources in another. The unique “closed”
nature of the these three leagues combined with easily measurable macroeconomic variables allow
us to isolate the impact of policy decisions on wealth distribution in a quantitative way that would
be much more difficult in a more complex, open economy.
This paper will seek to quantify the differing levels of income inequality, measured through
yearly player salary, between MLB, NFL, and the NBA, and assess how differences in the laws
governing the leagues may have contributed to these varying levels of income inequality.
Specifically, I will examine whether the use of a salary cap and contract structure in each league has
led to increased or decreased income dispersion. Before presenting my findings, further explanation
will be given to the specific structure of each league and how the data was used to capture income
inequality. This paper will ultimately answer the question, “Which American professional sports
league has the highest level of income disparity and what set of organizational decisions created this
inequality?”
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The main empirical analysis of this paper will be based on the derivation of the Lorenz Curve
and GINI coefficient for each league as well as the variance in the logarithmic values of salaries
within each league. The Lorenz Curve plots the actual income dispersion of an economy against
“perfect equality”. The line of perfect equality shows that every player has equal income, and an
increase of one player always yields a fixed increase in cumulative income for the entire league. The
further that the observed curve deviates from this curve represents an increased level of inequality,
meaning that an increase of one player may yield a more than proportional or less than proportional
increase in cumulative league income. From the Lorenz Curve we can derive the GINI coefficient for
each league, which is a numerical calculation of income inequality on a scale of 0 to 1. A GINI of zero
signifies perfect equality, meaning that every player makes the same salary while a GINI of 1, perfect
inequality, means that one player controls all the salary of a given league. From here, calculations of
the variance in salary of each league, the variance of salary of each team in each league, and a
breakdown of variance by income percentiles, will help to answer the question of where exactly
within each league the income disparity is originating. I will then examine how the use of revenue
sharing, salary caps, minimum wage, and luxury tax have impacted the allocation of wealth.
Before proceeding to the results section of this paper, I will overview the key organizational
concepts in Major League Baseball, the National Football League, and the National Basketball
Association and state my hypotheses as to how these will impact the inequality differences in each
league, discuss relevant literature on the topics on this paper and how those concepts are
complimented by the research in this paper, and provide insight on the origins and application of the
data.
Organizational League Overview
In order to contextualize the variation in income distribution in MLB, the NFL, and
the NBA, it is important to understand the policy decisions impacting the allocation of wages. An
aspect of this research that makes the analysis more interesting is the fact that all three leagues
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have chosen a different method of impacting player compensation, allowing a clearer picture of the
outcomes of these policies and how they compare to other leagues. In this section, I will discuss the
key differences between the “luxury tax” system used in Major League Baseball, the “hard” salary
cap in the National Football League, and the “soft” salary cap model in the National Basketball
Association.
The use of salary caps and revenue sharing models in professional sports did not arise with
the goal of equalizing income for players, but rather came as the result of another policy known as
free agency. Historically, players for professional sports teams would play their entire careers for
one team unless they were traded, as contracts contained reserve clauses that effectively tied them
to the team that signed them first. Beginning in the 1970s in Major League Baseball, players began
to argue that they had the right to sell their labor on the open market to the highest bidder: free
agency. In 1976, the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), a labor union comprised of
all MLB players that collectively bargains league rules and player issues, won a court case against
MLB that granted players the right to sign with any team they chose after their contract had expired.
The NFL followed suit in 1992 and the NBA soon after in 1996, and today every major professional
sports league has adopted basic free agency for players. The introduction of free agency
undoubtedly had a profound impact on income distribution in professional sports, as players could
now determine and pursue a market value for their talents rather than being beholden to the
appraisal of a single team, though it is the impact of the policies arising as a result of free agency
that his paper focuses on. The negative consequence of free agency was the erosion of competitive
balance, or the level of parity between the best and worst teams in a given league. Free agency
favors big market teams, or teams that have a wider support base and are capable of raising more
revenue than a small market team. Teams that made twice as much revenue could spend twice as
much money on players and small teams would have no way to compete, resulting in a league
dominated by a few teams year after year. It is here that the argument begins for whether team
owners should be profit maximizers or win maximizers. There exists an inherent tension between
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team owners and fans with regards to competitive balance. From a fan point of view, there is a
tradeoff between fans of the home team wanting their team to win and neutral fans wanting a game
with an unknown outcome and close score. By thinking of these two tradeoffs as a utility function,
there exists some Nash Equilibrium with a perfect competitive balance in the league to satisfy both
parties that can be mathematically derived (Késenne, Stefan, and Koning). This clashes, however,
with the idea of win maximizing team that seeks to spend as much as possible on the best available
talent in order to win. In this system, large market teams would dominate and few neutral fans
would be enticed to spend money to watch games, resulting in a loss in league revenue that would
ultimately harm those same large market teams financially. A profit maximizing team, on the other
hand, would seek to spend the least amount of money possible on salaries while maximizing firm
profit, an endeavor that could ultimately lose them fans, thus not maximizing the utility of the
“home team” fans mentioned above. In reality, teams are more likely to be win maximizers as long
as their budget constraints dictate that it is profitable to do so. Smaller market teams simply can’t
generate the revenue required to acquire the talent to maximize wins, and therefore seek to
maximize wins up to what is feasible from a profit standpoint (Totty, Evan S. and Mark F. Owens).
Weak teams, therefore, impose a negative externality on the large market teams that dominate the
league, and the idea for a salary cap that limits the total amount that one team can spend on player
salaries in a given year was introduced to improve competitive balance and partially internalize this
externality. The salary cap levels the playing field by capping what large market teams can spend in
an effort to normalize the salaries of players around the league and improve competitive balance in
the hopes that it maximizes league revenue and fan utility. While free agency reduces competitive
balance and increases the cost per unit of labor, a salary cap seeks to reverse or stem the effects of
both of these, and has been shown to decrease the cost per labor in leagues that employ a salary
cap and revenue sharing (Dietl, Helmut, Markus, and Rathke). Coexistent with a salary cap, all three
leagues have instituted some form of revenue sharing to equalize the revenue earned by all teams in
efforts to increase competitive balance. Although the execution of revenue sharing systems differ in
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MLB, the NFL, and the NBA, the basic idea is to pool a portion of the revenue earned by all the teams
and distribute it in equal portions, in which teams earning a relatively high amount of revenue
compared to other teams get less than they put in and small market teams conversely receive more
than they contributed. While all three leagues have adopted some form of the policies explained
above, the details of their implementation have key differences that will later come in to play when
explaining the differences in income distribution.
The NFL uses a “hard” salary cap as well as revenue sharing, making it the strictest of the
three leagues in how it goes about limiting team spending. A “hard cap” means that the league
determines the maximum amount that a team can spend in a given year on player salaries and no
team may spend more than that amount, with one exception. All contracts in the NFL must be
approved by the league office, and any contract that would place a team over the salary cap in a
given year is rejected. The exception to this rule is known as the carry over rule, which states that if a
team spends under the salary cap in one year, they may carry over the difference between the salary
cap and what they spent into a different year if they notify the league. For example, the salary cap in
the NFL in 2014 for every team was $133 million. If a team spent $128 million that year, they would
be eligible to carry over the $5 million difference into the 2015 season, and spend an additional $5
million over the 2015 salary cap. The salary cap is determined by the NFL before the start of every
season through a complex formula that calculates all league revenue from ticket sales, luxury boxes,
local and national TV broadcasting deals, royalties, concessions, parking, stadium leasing, and
merchandising, and then dividing that number equally between 32 teams. 48% of that number is
attributed to “player costs” which include salaries and player benefits such as health care, pensions,
and tuition. The portion of player costs that includes salaries is the salary cap number that each
team can spend in a given year. With regards to an individual player, the amount of compensation
that he receives is calculated for a given year based on his base salary in that year and any bonuses
received including options and signing bonuses, which can be prorated over the life of the contract.
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In contrast with the NFL, Major League Baseball does not have a salary cap but rather a
“luxury tax” that sets a salary cap number similar to the calculation in the NFL, but taxes teams on a
progressive basis if they spend over the salary cap number rather than preventing teams from
spending over it. The luxury tax works by assessing a penalty to the team for whatever amount of
money that they spend over the salary cap. If a team did not spend over the salary cap in the
previous season, they would pay a 17.5% tax on the difference between what they spent and the
salary cap in that given year. The tax increases to 30% if the team spent over the cap the previous
year, 40% if the team paid the 30% tax the previous year and spent over the salary tax this year, and
50% if the team paid the 40% last year and spent over the cap this year. As an example, if the salary
cap for 2014 was $100 million and a team spent $110 million in 2014, but did not pay any luxury tax
the year before, they would pay a 17.5% tax on the $10 million difference for 2014. If the salary cap
for 2015 was $120 million and the same team paid $150 million in salaries, they would then pay a
30% tax on the $30 million difference for 2015 because they went over the cap in the previous year
and this year as well. In tandem with the luxury tax system is Major League Baseball’s revenue
sharing program, in which all teams contribute roughly 34% of net local revenue to a pool that is
divided up equally between all 32 teams. In addition, a supplemental plan assigns each team a
performance factor each year, which can be positive or negative. Teams with positive performance
factor percentages pay an additional percentage of the 34% they contributed in net local revenue
while teams with negative performance factor percentages receive an additional percentage of net
local revenue in addition to the base revenue sharing payout. For example, a team with a
performance factor of 7% would pay the base 34% of revenue sharing plus an additional 7% of net
local revenue. A team with a performance factor of -7% would pay 34% of net local revenue to the
revenue sharing pool but would get back 7% of whatever they paid in, plus the payout of the base
revenue sharing. The goal of the supplemental plan is to increase the effective amount that the
largest market teams pay while increasing the amount received by the smaller market teams, or
those with negative performance factors. It is worth noting here that net local revenue includes a
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nearly comprehensive list of team revenue that is eligible for contribution to the revenue sharing
pool with the notable exception of local TV deals, which are exclusive broadcasting rights for home
games sold to local television stations, but I will return to this issue in the results section.
The NBA undoubtedly has the most complex and flexible competitive balance program of
the three leagues discussed in this paper with the combination of a “soft” salary cap and a revenue
sharing plan. The value for the salary cap every year in the NBA is set in a similar manner to the NFL.
Yearly basketball related income is projected before the season and agreed upon by team owners
and the Players Association, which acts as a labor union for the players. A portion of yearly
basketball income is then determined as player costs comprised of benefits and salaries and similar
to the NFL, the salaries portion marks the salary cap line for a given year. That is where the
similarities between the NFL and NBA salary cap system end, however, as the NBA uses a “soft” cap.
Recall that in the NFL a team can not violate the salary cap rule set by the league unless they have
leftover space from the previous year. In the NBA, teams can employ numerous exceptions to go
over the salary cap line, and in practice few teams are ever under the salary cap set by the league.
The most notable exception is the so called “Larry Bird Rule” which allows a team to resign its own
player to a maximum contract if that player has been with the team for at least 3 seasons and does
not violate any restrictions on the rule. Additionally, the “Early Bird Rule” allows a team to resign
one of their own players that has been with the team at least two seasons to a contract valued at
the highest of 175% of his previous contract or 104.5% of his average salary in the previous season,
with a few minor exceptions. The NBA is also unique from the other two leagues discussed in that a
player has a defined maximum salary number that increased incrementally based on the number of
years the player has been in the league. The maximum yearly salaries for the years covered in this
paper are shown in Table 1 below.
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Table 1
Years
in NBA1

Defined
maximum
salary

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

0-6

25% of cap2

$12,922,194

$13,668,750

$13,701,250

$14,746,000

$16,407,500

7-9

2

30% of cap

$15,506,632

$16,402,500

$16,441,500

$17,695,200

$19,689,000

10+

35% of cap2

$18,091,071

$19,136,250

$19,181,750

$20,644,400

$22,970,500

The NBA can be viewed as a hybrid system of the MLB and NFL in that it employs its own version of
the salary cap like the NFL, but also uses a luxury tax like MLB that works in tandem with its soft
salary cap. The luxury tax is calculated using the same method as the salary cap, though it takes a
larger portion of basketball related income before removing player benefits to get the salary portion.
Teams that spend over the soft salary cap using their exceptions that also spend over the luxury tax
line are taxed on every dollar they spend over the luxury tax rate in an increasing amount up to a
certain maximum. A summary of the luxury tax system for the NBA per the newest Collective
Bargaining Agreement is shown in Table 2 (Coon).
Table 2
Team salary above tax
level
Lower

Upper

Non-repeater
Tax rate

Incremental
maximum

Repeater
Tax rate

Incremental
maximum

$0

$4,999,999

$1.50

$7.5 million

$2.50

$12.5 million

$5,000,000

$9,999,999

$1.75

$8.75 million

$2.75

$13.75 million

$10,000,000

$14,999,999

$2.50

$12.5 million

$3.50

$17.5 million

$15,000,000

$19,999,999

$3.25

$16.25 million

$4.25

$21.25 million

$20,000,000

N/A

$3.75, and
increasing $.50 for
each additional $5
million.

N/A

$4.75, and
increasing $.50 for
each additional $5
million.

N/A

In addition to the exceptions listed above, there are several Mid-Level Tax exemptions designed for
teams that are below the luxury tax level that allow them to sign a free agent for a specified contract
without being taxed above the luxury tax, provided they meet certain criteria. For purposes of
comparison, the organization of the revenue sharing model in the NBA is essentially identical to that
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of the NFL, though there is a cap on the incremental amount that the largest and most profitable
teams can contribute.
Conceptually, based on the information described above, I expect that Major League
Baseball will be the most inequitable of the three leagues in terms of player salaries due to the
nature of their “soft” cap with no price ceiling. While it is true that teams are heavily taxed for
spending over the salary cap, there is no theoretical upward limit on what a team can spend on a
player as there is with maximum contracts in the NBA or a “hard” salary cap in the NFL. Because the
NFL has a hard salary cap that artificially limits the potential amount of contract variance in addition
to strict revenue sharing rules, I expect that the NFL will have the lowest GINI index with the NBA
somewhere between the NFL and MLB. Now that the groundwork has been laid to understand the
concepts that will be discussed later in the results section and what key differences I will focus on
between the three leagues, I will discuss relevant research related to the topics in this paper and
discuss how my research adds to these ideas as well as discuss the methodology and overview of the
calculations presented in the results section before presenting the findings of my research.
Literature Review
While little research has been done on the specific organizational differences that lead to
income differences in professional sports leagues, as my paper does, much work has been devoted
to the relationship between the use of the salary cap and competitive balance. Recall that the
primary objective of the salary cap was the equalize win percentages of teams in the league. The
focus of many studies has therefore been to determine how effective the policies have been in
improving competitive balance, which is closely related to income distribution if contract values
represent a true market value of labor that reflects player skill. One such study is titled “The
Combined Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues” by Dietl, Helmut,
Lang, and Rathke. In order to derive which combination of revenue sharing and a salary cap are ideal
for a league, this paper began with the benchmark case of two profit maximizing firms in a league
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structure with no binding salary cap or floor and introduced a basic revenue sharing model to
mathematically examine the impact on team revenues, win percentages, and cost of labor. By
assuming that firms are profit maximizers and modeling revenue as a function of market size, team
win percentage, and competitive balance, the authors were able to prove the impact of a revenue
sharing model on the revenue determinants listed above for both teams in this simplified model. The
paper then changed the assumptions for league organization, introducing a binding (hard) salary cap
or floor or both and then introducing revenue sharing to determine the outcome on both teams.
After examining the impact on four different structures, the paper concluded that under a
regime in which there is no salary cap or salary floor, the introduction of revenue sharing as no
effect on competitive balance, supporting the long established idea of the “invariance principle”
which states that talent distribution and therefore competitive balance is solely determined by team
revenue regardless of other factors (Rottenberg). This principle does not hold, however, when
revenue sharing is combined with some form of a salary cap or floor, as competitive balance and
firm profits are affected. According to their proofs, the introduction of a salary cap indeed does raise
the revenues of smaller market teams while increasing competitive balance, but reduces league
profits. In this system, the introduction of revenue sharing works to relocate talent and decrease the
cost per unit of labor on average. My paper will add to the work done in this paper by seeing if the
proofs done by the authors hold up in practice in leagues using both a binding and non-binding
salary cap in tandem with a revenue sharing model.
Taking a more analytical rather than theoretical approach, “Does a Salary Cap Improve
Competitive Balance?” by Endo, Florio, Gerber, and Sommers, seeks to statistically measure
competitive balance in the NBA pre and post introduction of the salary cap in 1984 to determine if
the cap was successful in increasing competitive balance. By using a ratio of cumulative percent of
games in in a season to cumulative percentage of teams, the authors developed a GINI index that
measured competitive balance rather than income equality and applied it to the NBA. These values
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were then computed in a regression model with the coefficient “cap” serving as a proxy variable for
years in which the salary cap was in place. The authors hypothesized that the coefficient of this
variable would be negative, meaning that during the years the salary cap was in place in the NBA the
outcome variable (competitive balance) would be closer to zero which represents perfect equality.
Contrary to the hypothesis, however, competitive balance decreased in the years following the
introduction of the salary cap as shown by a positive coefficient for the variable “cap”, though it was
not statistically significant at the 5% level.
The authors attributed this puzzling relationship to the nature of the “soft” cap system in the
NBA, which I explained in the previous section, in which the salary cap is much more fluid that what
was assumed in the model presented by the authors in the previous paper that I discussed. Similar
to this paper, my paper will use the GINI index as a measure of league parity though through the
context of income equality rather than win percentage equality. Furthermore, my paper will add to
the work done in this paper by seeking to explain how the soft cap system may have contributed to
increased variance in win percentages in the NBA.
Data Overview
Data analyzed in this paper was taken from the independent sports metrics database Spotrac, which
compiles statistics over a wide variety of contractual and skill related variables for all major
American sports leagues . For each league, I gathered the salary of every player from the 2010-2015
seasons and computed a logarithmic value of each salary. Due to the wide variance between the
highest paid and lowest paid player in the league and the bottom heavy, or fat left tail, distribution
of salaries I used a logarithmic value to normalize the distribution and make comparison between
the three leagues easier. As discussed in the previous section, MLB, the NFL, and the NBA, all have a
rookie minimum salary requirement which serves as the minimum wage for the league. Any player
with a salary below this requirement represents a player that was not on the team roster for the
duration of the season, was signed for a specified number of games, or was cut from the team. The

Thurman 15
salaries of these players were not included in any calculations shown in this paper, as they do not
give an accurate picture of the true compensation in the league and would skew the data. The table
below gives a brief overview of descriptive statistics for the timeframe examined in this paper
including the number of players for which salaries were analyzed each year, the average league
salary in the given year (Mean Salary), the salary of the highest paid player that year (Top Salary),
and the mandated minimum salary in the given year (Minimum Wage) as designated by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement of each league.

Descriptive Statistics

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

NFL
# Players
Mean Salary
Top Salary
Minimum Wage

MLB
# Players
Mean Salary
Top Salary
Minimum Wage

NBA
# Players
Mean Salary
Top Salary
Minimum Wage

1645

1885

2034

1705

1684

1644

$2,030,648.55

$1,840,499.52

$1,805,379.01

$1,995,827.45

$2,163,483.33

$2,351,365.37

$19,700,000.00

$17,818,000.00

$20,500,000.00

$20,850,000.00

$22,412,500.00

$23,800,000.00

$320,000.00

$375,000.00

$390,000.00

$405,000.00

$420,000.00

$435,000.00

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

830

839

848

815

802

866

$3,278,746.83

$3,318,838.25

$3,458,421.22

$3,723,344.35

$3,980,445.91

$4,220,201.38

$33,000,000.00

$32,000,000.00

$30,000,000.00

$29,000,000.00

$26,000,000.00

$32,571,429.00

$400,000.00

$414,000.00

$480,000.00

$480,000.00

$500,000.00

$507,500.00

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

449

504

538

390

434

442

$4,700,501.45

$4,443,151.43

$4,195,031.46

$4,972,155.66

$4,811,639.79

$4,801,939.40

$24,806,250.00

$25,244,493.00

$30,453,805.00

$30,453,805.00

$23,500,000.00

$25,000,000.00

$457,588.00

$473,604.00

$473,604.00

$490,180.00

$507,336.00

$525,093.00

1

The variance in the number of players examined each year is due primarily to fluxuations in
the number of players brought in and out of the league due to injuries, rules changes, the structure
of player contracts for a given team, or years directly following the introduction of a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement. While all three leagues dictate a minimum amount of players that can be on
a team’s roster as well as a maximum, the gap between these two allows teams to drop or cut
players or structure contracts in a way that pays some players more than other years at the expense
1

The large increase in NFL players from 2011-2012 is due to the implementation of a new CBA, the year before
which teams often allow themselves more space to sign new players under the potential new contract rules,
while the number of players smoothed out in the following years.
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of having perhaps one or two less players on the roster. Furthermore, the introduction of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, or a league wide set of rules covering every aspect of the sport
that is negotiated between the league’s labor union and team owners, has the potential to impact
both roster size and resource allocation depending on the nature and degree of changes from the
previous agreement. The largest variance in the number of players from year to year are in the NFL
from the 2011-2012 season and NBA in the 2012-2013 season, both of which are years following the
introduction of a new Collective Bargaining Agreement. For the actual measurement of the player
salaries themselves, the amount shown is not the “base salary” specified in a player contract but the
amount that counts towards the team salary cap in a given year, as this is the true amount of money
the player received in a given year as measured by the league. While the exact calculation of this
salary varies by league, it is composed almost entirely of base salary and any bonuses received by
the player in a given year for all the leagues. As we will see later in the results section, the use of
bonuses allows teams to structure contracts in ways that help them maneuver around the salary cap
and increase the variance in income distribution in the league, shown here by the non-linear
progression in average league salary and top salary for each league, but more on that later.
The main analysis in the following results section revolves around the computation of the
variance in the logarithmic values of salaries for both the league, the derivation of the Lorenz Curve
of each league, and the calculation of the GINI index. For each league, I calculated a basic leaguewide variance in salaries as a basic comparison for the magnitude of dispersion of salaries that
allows for a quick measure of income inequality for a league. This metric was also applied to each
team in the league, calculating the variance in salaries of every player on each team. To derive the
Lorenz Curve, every salary is computed as a percentage of the total sum of salaries in the league to
show the cumulative percent of salaries in each league. Each observation, or player, is divided by the
total number of observations in the league for that year to obtain the cumulative percent of the
population. These two are then plotted against each other against the case of “perfect equality”. The
perfect equality line shows an income dispersion in which every player receives the same salary, also
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the mean salary in the league that year, meaning that every player controls an equal portion of
league income. The gap between the perfect equality line and the Lorenz Curve is the graphical
representation of inequality in which a curve that deviates more from the perfect equality line
represents less equal distribution of wealth. The GINI index is a numerical representation of income
inequality that allows for direct comparison. A GINI of 0 represents perfect equality while a GINI of 1
represents perfect inequality, or one person controls all of the income in a given population. From
the Lorenz Curve, the GINI index for a given league can be calculated by dividing the area between
the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz Curve by the area under the line of perfect equality. More
explicitly, the GINI index is the difference between the integrals of the perfect equality line and
Lorenz Curve on the interval [0, 1] divided by the integral of the perfect equality line on the interval
[0, 1]. For example, we can examine the individual Lorenz Curve of Major League Baseball in 2010 in
which the line of perfect equality is shown by the line y=x and the Lorenz Curve is approximated by
an exponential function. The resulting GINI calculation is shown next to Table 3.

Table 3
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Lastly, to examine exactly where along the Lorenz Curve the greatest variance in salary
occurs, I measured the logarithmic dollar differences between income percentiles. For example, in
2010 the salary of the 90th percentile wealthiest player in the NBA was $16.28 in logarithmic terms
while the salary of the 10th percentile wealthiest player was $13.54. Thus, the inter-percentile
difference in logarithmic terms is $2.78. Examining the differences between percentiles in
logarithmic terms will allow me to analyze how portions of the Lorenz Curve of each league compare
and examine where exactly along the curve the greatest amount of variance is occurring.

Results and Analysis
In this section, I will show the results of the quantitative analysis between MLB, the NFL, and
the NBA, and explore the driving causes of the differences in income inequality. Although the NFL
and NBA were statistically quite similar despite having major organizational differences, MLB
showed the highest variance in player salaries and highest GINI index for all observed years as well
as the highest expected variance in team salaries. While the top and bottom 10% of each league
have statistically similar variance, the majority of income variance occurs in the middle 80%,
especially in Major League Baseball, where the middle 50% of the league has a much higher variance
when compared to the NFL and NBA. To explore this phenomenon in further detail, I will briefly
address the possibility that wages have been inflated in Major League Baseball by examining the
impact that the League’s competitive balance initiatives have had on player salaries. Lastly, I will use
the data shown in this section along with the organizational rules of each league to determine which
policy decisions have contributed to the level of inequality.
Table 4
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As shown in the above chart, Major League Baseball displays the highest absolute level of
income inequality as shown by the GINI index for each league in the years 2010-2015. While the NFL
displays a slightly higher level of inequality than does the NBA, the two leagues GINI scores in the
observed range remain within .0371 of each other, which is a largely insignificant difference in
income inequality. The other noticeable observation in this chart is the dramatic rise in the GINI
index for each league occurring the 2015 season. This is most likely attributable to the timing of the
recent Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) for each league. Recall that the CBA is the complete
set of league rules that is negotiated between the Players Union in each league and the team
owners. While the changes from one CBA to the next are usually subtle, the areas with the most
drastic changes generally involve those related to salary allocation such as the calculation of the
revenue sharing formula or the calculation of the minimum contract value for each season. As such,
owners like to have as much salary cap space and flexibility as possible in the year leading up to the
negotiation to accommodate any changes in league policy, and it naturally follows that the years
with the most expired contracts are years in which a new CBA is set to be struck. Since the largest
amount of contract negotiations with players occur in the year or two following a new CBA, teams
have less flexibility to structure contracts in a way that is advantageous for cap space. Recall that for
each league a player’s income in a year is measured by their base salary and any applicable bonuses.
Team owners frequently use the rules regarding bonuses to spread money out over the life of the
contract to allow them to maximize cap space in given years, and contracts are often “back loaded”
with the majority of a player’s bonus being granted near the end of the life of the contract. This
means that teams pay less towards the salary cap up front with the hope that they can restructure
the contract towards the end of the contract’s life in order to maximize the immediate salary cap
space available to them. Given that the latest NFL and NBA CBAs were renegotiated in the 20112012 season with MLB following suit in 2012-2013, I would attribute the rise in GINI seen in each
league in the 2015 season to the increased contract flexibility that owners have following the year or
two after the signing of the CBA along with the appearance of the back loaded contract bonuses that
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were signed in the new CBA year. This is supported by the decline in GINI for the NFL and NBA in the
season directly following the new CBA, 2013, and the decline in GINI for MLB in 2014.
Using data gathered from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) for 2012, and in
line with the analogy of each sports league as an independent economy presented in the
introduction to this paper, we can examine where the income inequality of each league ranks in
relation to selected countries measured using the same GINI index. Using 2012 data for GINI index,
all three leagues would measure in the top 10 most unequal countries in the world, with Major
League Baseball being the most unequal country by a small margin over Haiti. The NFL would rank
4th among the most unequal countries between Honduras and Columbia, while the NBA has an
income distribution similar to that of Panama. While the difference between the highest paid player
in baseball and the lowest paid is only $32,063,929 in 2015, a number which is surely much higher in
nearly any given country, the distribution of incomes in heavily skewed to the left in all three
leagues, generating a large amount of inequality. In MLB, for example, the top 5% highest paid
players control 20.53% of total league income with the 5% lowest paid players controlling 0.53%.
Thus, inequality in the leagues is driven much more by the distribution of incomes rather than the
gap between the highest and lowest paid players.
Now that we have examined the level of income inequality in absolute terms for each
league, we can begin to dissect where exactly along the Lorenz Curve the inequality is coming from.
Table 5 shows the trends in income difference for different percentile levels for 2010-2015, as well
as the exact GINI index numbers used in Table 4.

Table 5
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MLB
Variance
CV
1%-99%
5%-95%
10%-90%
25%-75%
GINI

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
1.562651 1.539063 1.539685 1.539685 1.548904 1.622578
0.087987 0.087196 0.086481 0.086481 0.086269 0.088081
3.86
3.88
3.79
3.78
3.82
3.86
3.48
3.49
3.37
3.29
3.43
3.47
3.16
3.17
3.03
2.72
3.17
3.17
2.32
2.31
2.27
1.58
2.30
2.42
0.6063
0.6089
0.6113
0.6076
0.5952
0.6143

NBA
Variance
CV
1%-99%
5%-95%
10%-90%
25%-75%
GINI

2010
1.037837
0.06846
3.65
3.14
2.73
1.72
0.4958

2011
0.985562
0.066932
3.69
3.10
2.65
1.69
0.5033

2012
1.010113
0.067263
3.71
3.20
2.66
1.62
0.5162

2013
1.010113
0.067263
3.79
3.42
3.11
2.30
0.5014

2014
0.898984
0.063428
3.23
2.80
2.57
1.53
0.4887

2015
1.117285
0.071146
3.75
3.40
3.18
1.70
0.5219

2010
1.038888
0.073093
3.66
3.15
2.70
1.64
0.5329

2011
0.940529
0.0699
3.47
2.91
2.50
1.54
0.5316

2012
0.897002
0.067766
3.41
2.94
2.46
1.39
0.5399

2013
0.897002
0.067766
3.44
2.94
2.42
1.42
0.5224

2014
0.930656
0.068674
3.54
2.90
2.45
1.54
0.5234

2015
0.94619
0.068815
3.53
2.89
2.51
1.57
0.5528

NFL
Variance
CV
1%-99%
5%-95%
10%-90%
25%-75%
GINI

Unsurprisingly, Major League Baseball displays the highest variance in salaries both by
percentiles and absolute terms, with the exception of the NBA in 2013, variance, and coefficient of
variation (CV). As hypothesized earlier, we can now conclude that Major League Baseball has the
highest income inequality as shown by every statistical measure included in my analysis. It must be
the case that a large portion of this variance comes from the structure of the luxury tax system
designed by the League. Per the luxury tax, any teams that violate the salary cap imposed by the
League are charged a tax on the dollar amount they spend over the cap on a progressive scale. While
this offers a strong incentive to avoid breaching the salary cap for a team that does not earn very
much revenue, if a team earns high enough revenue to reasonably afford the penalty then that
incentive is cancelled. Since 2003, only 6 teams have paid in to the luxury tax and only 3 of those
teams paid in more than once (Brown). Thus it can be reasonably assumed that the salary cap is
functionally binding for smaller market teams and non-binding for large market teams. The 3 teams
mentioned above that repeatedly paid more than the salary cap in a given year were the Yankees,
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Dodgers, and Red Sox, who perhaps not so coincidentally, also are the three highest grossing teams
in the league. While the revenue sharing program explain previously dictates that all teams pay an
equal share of Net Local Revenue and an additional fee or refund based on the team’s performance
factor, which is designed to force the larger market teams to pay in more than the 34% of Net Local
Revenue. However, this system does a poor job of capturing the variance in revenue generated by
teams’ local television broadcasting rights contracts. In 2013, two MLB teams were tied for a league
low $18 million per year local television deal that counts towards Net Local Revenue. This contrasts
with the nearly $340 million per year earned by the Los Angeles Dodgers in 2013. It is true that the
smaller two teams will receive much more money under the revenue sharing program than will the
Dodgers, who will pay a much larger portion of their $340 million than the other two teams will of
their $18 million, but it remains that the current CBA does not adequately control for the gigantic
variance in local television deals that give larger market teams much more revenue with which they
can spend over the salary cap. It should hold then that the highest grossing teams have the highest
team variance in salaries as well, as they have more money with which to spend on their best
players. Table 6 gives the variance in income for each team in MLB, the NBA, and the NFL, in the
2015 season followed by the average team variance for the 2015. As expected, the Yankees,
Dodgers, and Red Sox, the teams who repeatedly paid in to the luxury tax and who have the highest
local TV deals in the League, are all in the top 7 teams in the League ranked by highest team variance
in salaries.
Table 6
Var(Income, Team) E(Income, Team)

NFL

Var(Income, Team) E(Income, Team)

NBA
ARI
ATL
BAL
BUF
CAR
CHI
CIN
CLE
DAL
DEN
DET
GB
HOU
IND
JAC
KC

1.031941634
0.870127599
0.841094529
0.931813946
0.907111831
1.041607532
0.947738311
0.975923437
0.841516048
1.078733345
0.948900462
1.057575107
1.068292349
0.97075379
1.036591385

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

14.73
14.63
14.58
14.71
14.63
14.60
14.79
14.72
14.66
14.77
14.66
14.76
14.77
14.78
14.66

MIA

0.941314373 $

MIN
WAS
NE
NO

1.065777308
0.994291838
0.804133761
0.897107712
0.804886716

$
$
$
$
$

NYG
NYJ
OAK
PHI
PIT

0.920168138
0.905678507
0.94650157
0.749772013
0.932772752

$
$
$
$
$

Var(Income, Team) E(Income, Team)

MLB

Atlanta Hawks
Boston Celtics
Brooklyn Nets
Charlotte Hornets
Chicago Bulls
Cleveland Cavaliers
Dallas Mavericks
Denver Nuggets
Detroit Pistons
Golden State Warriors
Houston Rockets
Indiana Pacers
Los Angeles Clippers
Los Angeles Lakers
Memphis Grizzlies

1.274244354
0.913949977
1.0052433
1.005484634
1.423205142
1.302131441
1.396261076
0.599069536
0.808284052
1.170475148
1.24238702
0.876053826
1.574296006
1.577412037
1.465163051

$14.72
$14.59
$14.44
$14.94
$14.75
$15.31
$14.29
$15.06
$14.91
$15.27
$15.16
$14.97
$14.66
$14.73
$14.85

Angels
Astros
Athletics
Blue Jays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets

14.57

Miami Heat

1.717497378

$15.05

Nationals

14.67
14.74
14.55
14.53
14.60

Milwaukee Bucks
Minnesota Timberwolves
New Orleans Pelicans
New York Knicks
Oklahoma City Thunder

0.563801974
0.678432059
1.064478842
1.122471579
0.858603921

$14.79
$15.12
$15.11
$15.04
$15.25

Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers

14.80
14.65
14.74
14.53
14.69

Orlando Magic
Philadelphia 76ers
Phoenix Suns
Portland Trail Blazers
Sacramento Kings

1.089646721
0.779820118
1.306107508
1.033808295
0.981706551

$14.86
$14.65
$14.49
$14.43
$15.11

Rays
Red Sox
Reds
Rockies
Royals

1.861685112
1.166770938
1.196529431
1.791579162
1.260935085
1.813231132
1.733489927
1.371492346
1.14241192
1.82761468
1.422149086
1.149452769
1.701088269
1.26399733
1.591426493

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

14.51
14.16
14.00
14.32
14.32
14.29
14.48
14.58
13.92
15.13
15.00
14.34
14.48
14.32
14.21

1.716742279 $

14.82

1.29283553
1.535029428
1.907523352
1.161407136
1.887447479

$
$
$
$
$

14.64
14.54
14.24
14.28
14.34

1.127455616
1.988415391
1.415381024
1.397753289
1.049600146

$
$
$
$
$

14.10
14.75
14.61
14.26
14.75
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SD
SEA
SF
STL
TB
TEN

1.117405144
0.888929909
0.992955832
0.826439102
0.787408964
0.935770114
E[var(income,team)]
0.939407345

$
14.74
$
14.53
$
14.74
$
14.62
$
14.56
$
14.64
Var[E(income,team)]
0.006815115

San Antonio Spurs
Toronto Raptors
Utah Jazz
Washington Wizards

1.171979996
1.199679101
0.755933455
0.54014684

$14.80
$14.61
$14.58
$15.23

E[var(income,team)] Var[E(income,team)]
1.083259165
0.074946298

Tigers
Twins
White Sox
Yankees

2.171368957
1.59480724
1.572084396
2.12364867

$
$
$
$

14.79
14.49
14.43
14.94

E[var(income,team)] Var[E(income,team)]
1.541178454
0.082833114

The data presented above paints a clear picture that Major League Baseball has a much
higher level of variance in the salaries that it pays its players than do the NFL and NBA. The luxury
tax system was designed to discourage large market teams from dominating the labor market while
the performance factor portion of the revenue sharing program seeks to further level the playing
field by reducing the variance in available revenue between the most profitable and least profitable
teams. However, the 2012 MLB CBA failed to adequately address the monstrous growth in local
television contracts, which has given the highest earning teams in the league extra revenue that in
turn changes the incentive for these teams from avoiding spending over the salary cap to breaching
the salary cap and simply paying the relatively cheap luxury tax. In this case, the wealthiest teams in
the league effectively remove the price ceiling on labor that the League imposes, allowing them to
pay the best players in the League closer to what their true market value of labor might actually be.
From the work presented by Totty, Evan S., and Mark F. Owens, we know that teams act as win
maximizers up to the point that their budget constraint allows. The lack of a binding salary cap in
MLB effectively raises the artificial ceiling placed on teams’ budget constraint, allowing them to
spend more on labor to maximize wins. If the richest teams in the League are then able to spend
more on top talent that is closer to their market value, or at least are willing to outspend less
wealthy teams in order to attract top talent, then the market value of players of a similar skill level is
raised across the League in order for the less wealthy teams to compete for talent. What remains is
a small portion of the wealthiest players controlling an increasing portion of the income in the
League as bigger and bigger contracts force smaller market teams to pay their best players more,
leaving less money for mid-tier and lower-tier players, thus increasing the income inequality. We can
easily see where exactly along the Lorenz Curve this compounding inequality occurs by plotting the
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aggregate Lorenz Curves for all three leagues from 2010-2015 using inflation adjusted salaries,
shown in Table 7.
Table 7

As previously stated, the level of inequality for all three leagues is quite similar on the top and
bottom portion of the curve, meaning that the bottom 20% of each league and top 10% of each
league control comparable amounts of total league income in comparison to each other. The widest
gap between the leagues, however, occurs in the middle 50% of the curve in the 25%-75%
percentile. From Table 5, I showed that the gap in income between the 75th percentile wealthiest
player and 25th percentile wealthiest player was 1.57 for the NFL and 1.70 for the NBA in logarithmic
terms, while the same value for MLB was 2.42. With the exception of the 2013 season, this
observation holds for every year analyzed in this paper. I would argue that this relatively large gap in
income compared to the NBA and NFL is the result of the higher-tier players in MLB being paid
exponentially more than mid to low tier players as the result of potentially inflated wages or fairer
market values of labor brought about by the soft salary cap system in Major League Baseball.
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From this conclusion, I expected the NBA to show a higher level of income inequality than
the NFL given that the NBA has a similar soft salary cap and luxury tax system to that of MLB;
however the data above refutes this hypothesis. Interestingly, the NFL has the lowest average
variance in team income variances as shown in Table 6 as well as the lowest variance in average
team salaries by a wide margin (.0068 for the NFL, .0749 for the NBA, .0829 for MLB). This means
that on a team by team basis the distribution of wealth is relatively equal in absolute terms and
compared to the other leagues, yet the NFL has a higher GINI index for 2010-2015. Due to the fact
that the NFL has a hard salary cap that places a stop on the maximum variance in salaries, I expected
the NFL to have the lowest GINI index. Recall that the amount an individual player’s compensation
counts towards the salary cap in each league includes base salary and any applicable bonuses. The
NFL allows teams to prorate the bonus over the life of the contract regardless of when the money is
received. For instance, if a player signs a new contract for 5 years that includes a $10 million bonus,
the player may receive all of that $10 million in the first year of the contract in addition to the base
salary specified in the contract. However, the amount that counts towards the teams salary cap
would only be the base salary and $2 million of the bonus, as it is spread out equally over each year
of the contract. This provision allows teams to advantageously use bonuses to avoid going over the
salary cap in a given year, and is attractive for players because they get more of their contract
money up front. To analyze the effect of the use of bonuses on the GINI index of each league, I used
only the base salary and not any bonuses for each league in order to calculate a new GINI and Lorenz
Curve, the results of which can be found in Table 8.
Table 8

Thurman 26
Notice that for Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association, the Lorenz Curve
does not change much from the original Curve shown in Table 7. This is not surprising given the
minimal use of bonuses in these two leagues. In 2015, only 6 players in the NBA and 102 players in
MLB had some form of bonus contributing to their cap hit number, representing 1.3% and 11.96% of
players in the leagues, respectively. This compares to the much higher use in the NFL, in which
75.39% of players in the League received some form of bonus in 2015. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that the largest change in GINI when only including base salary occurs for the NFL. Major
League Baseball remained the most unequal of the Leagues with a mostly unchanged GINI index. The
NBA GINI index for base salary in 2015 is .50885, a change of .01305 from the total salary cap GINI
calculated in Table 5. The NFL recorded the largest change in GINI, down from .5528 to .50388 when
changing the calculation to only include base salary. While the changes in the NBA and MLB were
unsubstantial, a change of nearly .05 in the GINI index is significant; especially considering it is not a
year to year change but merely a calculation change. The new NFL GINI index then is the lowest of
the three leagues, though by a very narrow margin over the NBA. From this significant change in
GINI, it holds that the NFL has a higher GINI index than does the NBA due to the use of contract
bonuses being distributed over the life of the contract, meaning that a team’s salary cap number in a
given year may not be the true amount of money being paid in that year.
Conclusion
The results of this paper show that by every statistical measure included in this paper
including GINI index, variance of league salaries, average team variance of salaries, and GINI index of
base salary, Major League Baseball has the least equitable dispersion of income between the NFL,
NBA, and MLB. The driving cause of this relatively high level of income variance is due to the nature
of the luxury tax system and the ballooning growth of local television contracts, which has granted
large market teams the ability to pay top players substantially more in violation of the salary cap
with little regard for the luxury tax penalty, thus driving up the cost of labor for other teams as well.
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The NBA had the greatest level of income parity in terms of GINI index due largely to its employment
of a salary cap on individual salaries, thus reducing the potential variance between the highest and
lowest paid players for players of similar league experience, and its use of salary cap exceptions in
favor of small teams that allow them to sign larger contracts in violation of the salary cap without
fear of the luxury tax penalty. The NFL showed surprisingly low levels of variance among teams and
low variance among the average salary of each team, yet still had a higher GINI index than did the
NBA for 2010-2015. This unexpected variance can be controlled for by recalculating the GINI index to
only include a player’s base salary rather than the total amount contributing to the salary cap, as
teams in the NFL have a large incentive to grant large bonuses because of the accounting benefits it
garners in relation to the salary cap. When looking at the base salary GINI, the NFL and NBA have
virtually equal levels of income inequality.
While this paper examined the impact of a salary cap and revenue sharing on income
inequality, it is important to note that the stated objective of these initiatives was to increase
competitive balance in the leagues rather than income balance. An analysis of income balance
makes for an interesting alternative measure of competitive balance, however, when assuming that
team owners attempt to maximize wins through spending on labor within the constraints of their
budget. The research in this paper is complimented by the work of several other papers that analyze
the impact of a salary cap on the variance in win percentages in order to measure competitive
balance, and a side by side analysis of the variance of win percentages and the variance of salaries
would provide a better picture of how effective or ineffective these measures have been. The
calculations in this paper would then need to be compared to years before the salary cap or revenue
sharing were introduced into the leagues in order to fully analyze how the allocation of wins and
salaries has changed with new CBAs. This research could be taken a step further by calculating a skill
adjusted salary for MLB players. In this paper I introduced the idea that the rapid growth of local
television contracts have led to increases in the salaries of top talent in Major League Baseball.
While this is undoubtedly part of the puzzle, it could also be the case that rather than reflecting a
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better market value of labor for players, salaries have simply been inflated in MLB by large market
teams who outprice their small market competitors by offering contracts that exceed what the fair
market value for similarly skilled players is. In order to test for this possibility, player salaries would
have to be collected in tandem with a proxy variable for player skill in the corresponding year. If
after controlling for other salary determinants such as years of experience and position there exists a
significant gap between the regression prediction for salary based on skill and the observed results
of top players, it might be the case that wages have indeed been inflated. While the research in this
paper is not complete in its analysis of change over time, it offers a strong foundation for
comparison between leagues that compliments the large volume of work analyzing competitive
balance in each league. Given that exclusive television contracts have become such a lucrative
business for sports leagues, the demand for which is driven largely by indifferent viewers wishing to
see a contested game (Késenne, Stefan, Koning, and Ruud), the issue of competitive balance and by
extension income inequality will become an increased point of focus for sports leagues competing
over viewers and revenues.
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